Much has been made of the Prime Minister's statement that India is not going to grow at an official rate of 8 per cent (I think unofficially it is already growing at more than 8 per cent). The economic reasons are well known and don't need to be repeated.

But what about the non-economic reasons that are directly under the Prime Minister's control and which, moreover, are powerful decelerators of the official rate?

One of these non-economic reasons relates to those who manage the government, from the lower division clerk to the all-India and central services. Specifically, what kinds of people want to work for the government now?

I was obliged to face this question when, a few days ago, a college student asked me if he should consider government service as a career option and, if so, as the last one. It is one of the hardest questions I have ever been asked.

Most of my friends and colleagues, however, don't think so. They say it is what the Americans call a "no-brainer" because only the completely useless work for the government. Why? Because what the government does is completely useless. Wonderful!

Many readers will probably recall that this decline in preference amongst the best and the brightest for government jobs was not in evidence until quite recently, perhaps as late as 1995.

Although, thanks to the economic reforms that had started four years earlier, jobs outside the government were proliferating, as never before, it was essentially a no-contest as far as job preferences went. Government jobs were still the preferred option.

But now the tables have been turned. Government service is generally seen as something you are forced to do when all else (even print journalism!) has failed. The reasons are well known but few realise that they have always been there.

For example, the pay differentials are not new. The box-wallahs always got paid much more, both monetarily as well as in terms of the perks available. But the private sector was never the first choice. Even the public sector, which simply no one wants to join voluntarily now, was preferred over it.

Incidentally, plain simple envy had much to do with the taxation of private sector perks. But then, as now, the taxers conveniently chose to overlook their own perks, which were quite substantial even then and are even more so now.

Free servants were the most important of these but there were -- and still are -- lots of other things as well. If Mr Chidambaram has the guts, he should tax these as well.

Also, the generally clean, contractual nature of private sector employment -- as opposed to the sticky, ill-defined and chewing-gummy nature of government service -- was always recognised. But it did not prevent people from opting for the latter as their first choice. The power and the prestige made up for the messy nature of things.

In short, while the best and the brightest opted to work for the government, it was the ne'er-do-well types who were obliged to find employment in the private sector. I was one of them. There were exceptions, of course, but very few.

Other countries too have grappled with the problem of declining quality in the civil services. They have tried different methods. Some have succeeded, others not. India needs to make a beginning now.

I don't suppose the Prime Minister has the time to think about this issue, but on his next trip abroad when he has some time to himself on the Air-India jet he should devote a few minutes to it. The issue for consideration can be framed as follows:

"If governance today is what it is in spite of the best and the brightest having joined the government until a mere decade ago, what is going to happen to it in a few years from now when only the currently otherwise unemployable are working for it and begin to come into senior positions?"

There are two ways of dealing with the problem. One is to refuse to acknowledge it on one pretext or another. The other is to address it seriously but without the artifact of a committee to which this government appears addicted. None is needed because the core of the problem, which the various committees on administrative reforms never deal with, is easily identified.

It has two elements -- poor pay and politicians and the associated compromises with conscience that are required of decent people. The first conveys a sense of sloth and the second, a sense of sleaze. The power that goes with a government job no longer compensates for these two.

The Fifth Pay Commission had tried to address the pay problem. But its efforts came to nothing, partly because the willingness to accept change had not become ingrained in the political class at that time. But it seems to have now and the opportunity should be utilised. Why, even the CPM is going to have younger bosses.

So, given this important change in attitude it may be worthwhile trying to resurrect the unfinished part of what the Fifth Pay Commission had recommended. The Prime Minister surely knows how angry his friend and member of the Fifth Pay Commission, Professor Suresh Tendulkar, was when only a part of the report was accepted. Now that he is a member of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council, he can be asked to review the whole thing once again.

The politician-cum-corruption problem is more intractable. If you count condoning corruption by your party colleagues as corruption as well, then there is no such thing as a clean politician. Guilt by association is a well-accepted principle.

The real task, therefore, is of devising incentives that act as powerful counters to the problem of politicians and the associated sleaze. The power is still there, of course, though many civil servants would vociferously disagree, saying that real power now resides with the politicians and a few large business houses.