• The so-called Indian Mujahideen, which has claimed responsibility for these incidents, first made its appearance after the judgment was delivered by a Mumbai court last year awarding severe sentences in the case relating to the Mumbai blasts of March 12, 1993.
The March 1993 blasts were organised by Dawood Ibrahim with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. Many of those convicted in the case were his close associates.
• All the blasts which have taken place since November last, have involved the mobilisation of considerable human and material resources.
• This is so particularly in Gujarat. There were 16 blasts in Ahmedabad [Images]. In Surat [Images], 18 unexploded improvised explosive devices were found after the Ahmedabad blasts, on Tuesday alone.
• Normally, terrorists follow the principle of one perpetrator for planting one IED. That means, there were at least 37 perpetrators. Normally, each perpetrator has at least one person to provide back-up support. Thus, it is estimated that the total number of individuals involved must have been at least 70-plus.
• The group which was involved in the terrorist strikes in Gujarat was reported to have procured or stolen at least three motor vehicles in Mumbai and brought them to Gujarat. Two of these were used in Ahmedabad and one with some LNG cylinders was found in Surat.
• The mobilisation of such a large number of people plus the procurement of the motor vehicles would have involved considerable expenditure.
• Only Dawood Ibrahim would have had such resources and the ability to mobilise such a large number of people.
• If he had orchestrated these strikes, where did he get these men trained -- in Pakistan with the ISI's help as he did before March 1993, or in India? In March 1993, he used only Indian Muslims for carrying out the blasts.
• In March 1993, he got all the material for the blasts from the ISI. This time, the material would appear to have been procured in India.

An intriguing aspect is, why all the IEDs planted in Surat did not explode. Some reports have said that it was because of the rains. The IEDs in Surat must have been planted at the same time as those in Ahmedabad. On July 26, when the blasts took place in Ahmedabad, there were no rains, which came only the next day. If rains were the reason for the failure, the IEDs in Surat must have been timed to explode a day after the blasts in Ahmedabad.

The other possibility is that the terrorists deliberately did not want the Surat IEDs to explode but wanted the police to remain preoccupied with defusing them so that they can carry out blasts in some other town.